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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
VICKI L. CROMPTON, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : 
Case No. 930827-CA 
vs. : 
Priority 15 
CLIFFORD BRENT CROMPTON, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has 
jurisdiction to review all final judgments and orders of 
the District Court involving domestic relations cases 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953, 
as amended) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS EXCESSIVE AND CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
THE AWARD WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF THE 
COURT. 
Standard of Appellate Review: The trial Court must 
-1-
consider the standards for alimony set forth in Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991) and Jones v. Jones, 
700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). The trial Court must also 
support its ruling with adequate findings that do not 
constitute an abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 
P.2d 96 (Utah 1986); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 
(Utah App. 1988) and Willev v. Willev, 227 U.A.R. 39 
(Utah App. 1993). 
2. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FASHION AN 
ALIMONY AWARD PREMISED UPON A REQUIREMENT THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WORK FIFTEEN HOURS PER WEEK OVERTIME. 
Standard of Appellate Review: Defendant does not 
contest the Court's factual finding concerning his 
historical overtime income. Defendant challenges the 
trial Court's legal conclusion that his alimony 
obligation should be premised upon a requirement that he 
continue to work at least fifteen hours per week 
overtime. Accordingly, the trial Court's decision should 
be afforded no special deference and the appellate Court 
should review the decision for correctness. Smith v. 
Smith. 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990) and Whitehead v. 
Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1992). 
3. BECAUSE OF THE DISPARITY IN VALUES OF PERSONAL 
PROPERTY AWARDED TO EACH, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
-2-
MADE AN ADJUSTMENT IN THE DIVISION OF THE HOME EQUITY 
FUNDS. 
Standard of Appellate Review: The appellate Court 
may modify decisions of the trial Court in its 
apportionment of marital property if the trial Court's 
division was clearly unjust or constituted a clear abuse 
of discretion. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 
1988) ; Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988) 
and Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 823 (Utah App. 
1989). The distribution must also be based on adequate 
factual findings. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 
(Utah App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal from the property distribution and 
alimony award of the Decree of Divorce of the Second 
Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon presiding. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
This matter was tried before the Honorable 
Michael D. Lyon on September 28, 1993. The matter was 
taken under advisement and the Court entered its Decision 
on October 27, 1993. After Findings of Fact and the 
Decree of Divorce were prepared and filed, defendant 
-3-
Brent Crompton timely filed this appeal. 
III. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT. 
The Court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff 
permanent alimony in the sum of $1,100.00 per month. 
This was premised upon the Court's belief that the 
defendant could and should work fifteen hours overtime 
per week. 
The parties stipulated to the division of personal 
property. Since the property going to the plaintiff 
exceeded in value the property going to the defendant, 
the defendant contended that this disparity should be 
partially equalized by awarding him a greater portion of 
the sale proceeds of the home that were available for 
distribution. The Court concluded that defendant was 
better positioned to replace items of personal property 
than the plaintiff and refused to make any further 
adjustment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on December 8, 1967. Two 
children were born during the marriage, only one of whom 
was a minor at the time of trial. That child is 
scheduled to turn eighteen and graduate from high school 
in June of 1994. (T6-7) 
The parties had previously stipulated that 
-4-
Mrs. Crompton would be awarded custody of the minor child 
and Mr. Crompton would pay her a gross child support of 
$333.90 per month. After receiving a $46.00 credit 
towards the health insurance premium that Mr. Crompton 
paid to insure the minor child, his net monthly child 
support payment was stipulated to be $285.00 per month. 
This support award was calculated utilizing 
Mrs. Crompton's gross monthly income of $1,343.00 and 
Mr. Crompton's gross monthly income on a forty-hour work 
week of $3,158.00. (R58) 
The parties had sold their residence prior to trial. 
This produced a total equity of $14,583.00. Pending the 
trial, Mrs. Crompton's counsel was retaining $13,225.00 
and Mr. Crompton had $1,358.00 which was the reserve 
account balance. The parties disagreed as to how these 
funds should be divided. (T4-5) 
The parties had substantial marital debts at the 
time of trial. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 and Defendant's 
Exhibit 11) Although there was some disagreement about 
which debts were marital, the parties had agreed that the 
marital debts should be paid with the home equity funds. 
The Court decided which were marital and which should be 
paid individually by the parties. (R62-63) The Court 
ordered the marital debts to be paid from the home equity 
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funds and the remaining balance of those funds to be 
divided equally between the parties. (R62) 
At the time of trial, Mrs. Crompton was forty-five 
years old and was employed in a sales capacity at Mervyns 
in Ogden. She had been there approximately six years and 
was earning $7.75 per hour. (T9,12) During the marriage, 
she had worked approximately seventeen years which 
included employment in a dental and medical clinic and 
other retail sales. (T10) 
Mr. Crompton had been working at Kimberly Clark for 
approximately eight years prior to the divorce. (T8) His 
1993 year-to-date income information (as of 
September 12, 1993) was introduced showing a base wage 
for a two-week period at $1,457.88 and a year-to-date 
gross figure of $50,806.34. This gross figure reflected 
that about one-half of his income was produced by 
overtime. (T48 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) Historically, 
Mr. Crompton had worked frequent overtime. His prior 
years' income was entered into evidence showing as 
follows: 
YEAR GROSS INCOME 
1989 $63,975.47 
1990 $67,881.47 
1991 $71,749.47 
1992 $67,500.00 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 6) 
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More than fifty percent of these gross figures were 
overtime and holiday pay. 
Mr. Crompton conceded that he had considerable 
overtime. He stated, however, that the overtime was not 
required as a condition of keeping his job; it was not 
guaranteed, nor was it always available. (T48-50) 
Mr. Crompton contended that the prospects for the 
same amount of overtime in the future were not 
predictable, but in all likelihood, the amount of 
overtime would be less in the future than what had been 
available in the past. (T49) His personal work regimen 
was more rigorous than most of the other similarly 
situated employees. Of the fifty or so individuals who 
were employed at Kimberly Clark with the same job title 
or responsibility as his, only eight or ten of them 
worked as much overtime as he did. (T49-50) 
Mrs. Crompton acknowledged that during the last 
several years of the marriage, she and her husband were 
financially distressed. In addition to the bills, they 
had end-of-year tax problemsf requiring them to pay 
considerable amounts to both the State of Utah and IRS. 
(T17) Her husband's overtime income was a means of 
handling these obligations. 
Mr. Crompton said the necessity of overtime was 
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created because of the parties' purchase of an expensive 
home, furniture and drapes for that home, as well as the 
other large debts listed on the exhibits mentioned above. 
(T50-53) The parties' mortgage payment prior to the sale 
of the home was $1,000.00 per month. (T77) Mr. Crompton 
had increased his exemptions so he could pay the family 
debt obligations. This would then result in a large tax 
obligation at the end of each year. Overtime was the 
only method by which he could maintain the debt structure 
the parties had created for themselves. (T51-53) 
Mrs. Crompton claimed that her net income was 
$1,003.00 per month and after adding the stipulated child 
support and deducting her average monthly expenses and 
debts, she was still short $951.00 per month. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) Her calculation of net income 
was in error. After deducting only mandatory deductions, 
her net was actually $1,084.00. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) 
She had $53.95 per pay period of optional deductions. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and T34-35) 
In support of her alimony claim, Mrs. Crompton 
introduced Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 which reflected her 
monthly expenses as of then and what she anticipated they 
would be in the immediate future. (T20) Her gross total 
of claimed needs, excluding debts being assumed by her, 
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was $2,100.00 per month. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) Of 
that amount, she claimed $100.00 per month gas and 
maintenance on her current vehicle, contending that the 
vehicle had serious mechanical problems and this amount 
was necessary to cover anticipated repairs. She also 
requested $200.00 per month as the estimated cost for the 
lease or purchase of a more reliable vehicle. 
Mrs. Crompton acknowledged that if she were able to 
replace her current automobile and incur the $200.00 per 
month expense, her maintenance costs on her vehicle 
would, in all probability, go down. (T37) 
She was paying $76.00 per month for a storage unit 
which, for the most part, was only used to store items 
for the children. (T38) 
She admitted that Exhibit 2 represented expenses for 
her and her minor child (T39-40), even though the minor 
child was employed on a part-time basis and bought her 
own clothes and gas. (T20) It also included clothing 
expenses for her and her daughter (T39) and $125.00 for 
expenses exclusively for her daughter for such things as 
school-dances-lunches, etc. Mrs. Crompton said that the 
bills to Discover and Express Clothing, representing a 
total monthly obligation of $119.00, were for clothing 
purchases for herself and her daughter, even though she 
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had included clothing purchases averaging $100•00 per 
month in her estimated needs. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 
and T41) 
Mr. Crompton prepared an exhibit itemizing his 
average monthly living expenses. Using his base wage of 
$3,158.00 per month and assuming a 35% total tax 
obligation, his net base pay would be $2,050.00 per 
month. Before deducting any sums for child support or 
alimony, his estimated monthly living expenses would 
cause a monthly shortfall of just slightly in excess of 
$1,100.00. (Defendant's Exhibit 13 and T57) 
The parties had stipulated to the manner in which 
the personal property would be divided. Mr. Crompton 
contended that the value of the personal property going 
to him was $2,020.00, while the value of the personal 
property going to Mrs. Crompton was $12,955.00. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 10) Mrs. Crompton claimed that the 
personal property value disparity was much less, although 
she acknowledged a difference favoring her of just over 
$1,000.00. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5) Mr. Crompton was not 
contesting the division of the furniture, but requested 
a greater share of the home equity funds to partially 
correct the imbalance in value of the items of personal 
property going to each. (T55) 
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At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the 
matter under advisement (T91) and issued its Ruling on 
October 27, 1993. (R43-55) 
The Court found that the plaintiff had a net monthly 
income of approximately $1,003.00 (R45) and that 
defendant had worked substantial overtime to help retire 
family debt. The Court further found that historically 
defendant had worked twenty to thirty hours overtime per 
week, including some instances of double time on Sundays. 
(R45-46) 
Although the Court found it not reasonable to expect 
defendant to continue to work those kinds of hours for a 
failed marriage, it was going to impute income to him 
based on a "reasonable work ethic". The Court concluded 
that it would use fifty-five hours as to what he would 
reasonably be expected to provide for his wife so she 
could enjoy the standard of living to which the parties 
had become accustomed. (R46-47) 
The Court found that Mrs. Crompton's reasonable 
monthly expenses, including her debts, were $2,200.00 per 
month. The Court found that Mr. Crompton's reasonable 
monthly expenses were $1,972.00 per month. (R47) 
Based upon a fifty-five hour per week work 
requirement, the Court found that Mr. Crompton's 
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reasonable gross monthly income would be $4,395.00 per 
month and after deducting an estimated 35% taxes, found 
that his monthly net income would be approximately 
$3,208.00 per month. (R47) Based upon those findings, 
the Court ordered Mr. Crompton to pay Mrs. Crompton 
$1,100.00 per month as alimony. That award included 
Mrs. Crompton's claim for better transportation and the 
fact that the child support was going to terminate in 
less than a year. It anticipated the child support 
termination and specifically prohibited Mrs. Crompton 
from returning to Court for a Petition to reopen alimony 
based on the emancipation of the minor child. (R48) The 
Court also claimed to take into account the potential 
that Mrs. Crompton could be eligible in the future to 
have a modest increase in wages, receiving $1.00 per hour 
more. (R4 8) 
The Court determined what were marital debts to be 
paid from the proceeds being held from the sale of the 
home and ordered that any remaining proceeds after the 
payment of those debts be divided equally. (R49) 
The Court ordered Mrs. Crompton to pay those debts 
itemized on her Exhibit 2, the debts to Discover, Lil 
Audreys and Express Clothing, as well as the remaining 
balance due on her automobile to America First Credit 
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Union which was $169.00 per month. (R49 and Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 7) Mr. Crompton was required to pay Avco which 
had a $1,682.00 balance at $97.00 per month and the 
balance for his boat at $157.00 per month. (R50) 
The Court affirmed the division of personal property 
agreed to by the parties and after acknowledging that 
there was a disparity in values, denied Mr. Crompton's 
request that he receive a greater portion of the home 
equity and concluded that he was in a better position 
than her to replace items of personal property. (R51) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The $1,100.00 per month alimony awarded 
Mrs. Crompton exceeded the Court's findings as to her 
needs. It did not actually take into account her ability 
to produce additional income for herself even though the 
Court said that fact was considered. It reduced 
Mr. Crompton to a point substantially below what the 
Court found to be his reasonable needs and exceeded his 
ability to pay. The alimony award was an abuse of the 
Court's discretion. Adequate findings were not provided 
to explain or justify the award. 
This alimony award was premised upon the Court's 
conclusion that Mr. Crompton could and should work a 
full-time job plus average fifteen hours per week 
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overtime. The issue of overtime to justify an alimony 
award is an issue of first impression in Utah. It should 
not be upheld in this case. The historical overtime 
income of Mr. Crompton was required by reason of the 
Cromptons living beyond their means, the creation of 
excessive debt and a large house payment. The divorce 
got rid of the debt and the house payment. It should not 
continue to impose on Mr. Crompton the requirement to 
work excessively to support a failed marriage. 
The amount of personal property awarded to 
Mrs. Crompton exceeded in value the personal property 
awarded to Mr. Crompton. The Court denied Mr. Crompton's 
request to partially correct this imbalance by awarding 
him a greater share of the home equity funds. Not only 
were these funds divided equally, but the Court also 
imposed greater debt on Mr. Crompton and arbitrarily 
concluded Mr. Crompton was in a better position to deal 
with that inequity. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS EXCESSIVE AND CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. THE AWARD WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF THE COURT. 
The factors that a trial Court must consider in 
awarding and fixing alimony have been clearly and 
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repeatedly articulated. Those factors are: 
1. The financial conditions and needs of the 
spouse seeking support. 
2. The ability of the spouse seeking support to 
produce sufficient income for herself. 
3. The ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support. 
See Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2df 489, 491 (Utah App. 1991); 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
The trial Court must also support the alimony award 
with adequate findings that do not constitute an abuse of 
discretion. See Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 
1986); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 
1988); and Willey v. Willev, 227 U.A.R. 39 (Utah App. 
1993).x 
Mrs. Crompton was employed as a sales person at 
Mervyns earning $7.75 per hour which represented an 
average gross income of $1,343.00 per month. She claimed 
her monthly net income was $1,003.00, but her leave and 
earning statement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) showed that 
1
 Recently, the Appellate Court has seemingly relaxed this 
requirement by suggesting that findings can be implied if it is 
reasonable to assume the trial Court actually considered the 
controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding to resolve the 
controversy, but simply failed to record the factual determination 
it made. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993); Hill v. 
Hill. 229 U.A.R. 46 (Utah App. 1993) 
-15-
after deducting mandatory deductions, her monthly net 
would be $1,084.00 and even after subtracting her 
optional deductions, her monthly net was $1,030.00. The 
Court relied upon her testimony rather than her exhibit 
in finding her net income to be $1,003.00. (R45) As for 
the future, Mrs. Crompton claimed that without a degree, 
she could only be promoted to an area coordinator, but it 
would involve a "dollar or so raise". (Til and 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) 
Mrs. Crompton claimed that her needs, excluding 
debts being assumed by her, were $2,100.00 per month. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) 
Assuming for purposes of this point on appeal, the 
Court was accurate in concluding Mr. Crompton should work 
fifty-five hours per week and thereby have a gross 
monthly income of $4,395.00 and a net of $3,208.00, the 
support award was still clearly excessive. He was to pay 
a stipulated child support of $285.00 per month and a 
Court-ordered alimony obligation of $1,100.00 per month. 
This would leave him with $1,823.00 per month, even 
though the Court found his reasonable monthly expenses to 
be $1,972.00. (R47) 
Mr. Crompton claimed that his average monthly living 
expenses were $3,177.00. (Defendant's Exhibit 13) The 
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Court made no findings explaining how it arrived at 
Mr. Crompton's average monthly expenses or which expenses 
from Exhibit 13 were unnecessary or excessive. The Court 
seems to have arbitrarily picked a figure. 
Neither the Court's finding as to Mr. Crompton's 
reasonable monthly needs, nor Mr. Crompton's claimed 
needs, included the bills to Avco, which the Court 
assigned to him, or for the boat. These cause an 
additional $254.00 per month expense to him, thereby 
further reducing his ability to meet his needs and pay 
the alimony. Mr. Crompton requested that the Avco bill, 
with a $97.00 per month payment and a $1,682.00 balance, 
be paid with the home equity funds. A trial Court is 
required to take into account the division of debts as it 
affects an alimony award. Willev v. Willey, 227 U.A.R. 
39 (Utah App. 1993). There is no finding to suggest that 
these debts were considered. 
On the other hand, the Court found that 
Mrs. Crompton's reasonable monthly expenses, including 
her debts, were $2,200.00 per month. When using her 
actual net income of $1,084.00 without optional 
deductions (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1), and adding the 
stipulated child support and court-ordered alimony, she 
would have $2,469.00 per month, $269.00 per month more 
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than the Court found to be her reasonable monthly 
expenses. Although the Court claimed this award did take 
into account Mrs. Crompton's probably ability to earn 
$1.00 per hour more in the future, it did not seem to 
account for the $175.00 per month that Mrs. Crompton 
could make with that increase, yet it required 
Mr. Crompton to continue to work for fifty-five hours per 
week into the future. Also, the alimony award did not 
take into account the unnecessary or duplication of 
expenses she had noted in her exhibit, i.e. unusually 
high car expenses when the Court provided an allowance 
for a newer car; clothing expenses paid for on a monthly 
basis and then added again with her charge cards; 
expenses for her daughter who was working and who would 
soon be emancipated; and a storage unit to store mainly 
children's toys. 
In analyzing the Bell supra, and Jones supra, 
alimony factors, the Court did nothing more than enter a 
conclusionary finding on the first factor as to financial 
conditions and needs of Mrs. Crompton. With respect to 
this factor, the Court said: 
Court finds that the wife's reasonable 
monthly expenses, including the debt 
to America First Credit Union for her 
automobile, is $2,200.00 a month. And 
the Court finds that is very modest and 
maybe somewhat a little unrealistic, 
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but will accept that as her income, (sic) 
(R47) 
The Court went on to say: 
In making this award (alimony), the 
Court is cognizant of her claim for 
better transportation. I'm also 
cognizant that the child support is 
going to terminate in less than a year. 
There is some case law that suggest 
that when that terminates, the wife 
can come in and seek a petition for 
modification to open the alimony 
question. The Court will not permit 
that in June of 1994. In other 
words, in looking at alimony, I have 
anticipated that . . ." (R48) 
As to the second factor, her ability to produce 
sufficient income for herself, the Court found her net 
income to be $1,003.00 (a mistake) and the Court said it 
was taking into account her ability to earn $1.00 or more 
per hour in the future, but did not give an appropriate 
reduction to Mr. Crompton in the alimony award and did 
not factor that into her ability to provide for her 
monthly needs in the future. The Court only said: 
And finally, the Court is also 
cognizant that she is eligible, 
or in the future, to have a 
modest increase in her wages. 
And I'm trying to see where that 
was. Apparently, she could be an 
area coordinator without a degree 
or one step higher and receive a 
dollar an hour more. 
The Court in that regard will 
further find that she is forty-five 
years of age. That she was married 
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when she was nineteen. Find further 
that she had primarily worked in 
retain sales and also had a brief 
start as a dentist for two and 
one-half years. That she's worked 
a total of sixteen years out of the 
marriage. There was a period of 
about eight years after the second 
child when she didn't work. Find 
that she is probably employed at 
her highest and best employment. 
(R48) 
The "$1.00 or more per hour" would allow 
Mrs. Crompton to gross about $175.00 extra each month. 
This increase would provide additional funds for her 
needs, yet by this comment, the Court prevented that 
increased income from affecting the alimony. 
Mr. Crompton could not petition for modification. 
Mrs. Crompton gets the pay raise as a gratuity. The 
Court must consider and enter findings as to why this 
additional income should or should not alter her ability 
to provide for her own needs. See Johnson v. Johnson, 
855 P.2d 250 at 253 (Utah App. 1993). 
Most importantly, however, was the total lacking of 
any finding analyzing how Mr. Crompton would have the 
ability to pay the support that was ordered. In this 
regard, the Court said: 
Court finds that the husband's 
reasonable monthly expenses are 
somewhere around $1,972.00. He 
delineated other expenses and 
certainly he could claim those, 
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but the Court tried to fix what 
seemed reasonable for him and 
just him and not the other people 
that are living with him . . . 
I find that his net income will be 
somewhere around $3,208.00. It's the 
judgment of the Court that a reasonable 
amount of alimony for the plaintiff 
should be $1,100.00 per month . . . 
(R47-48) 
The Court provided no other explanation as to how it 
arrived at Mr. Crompton's reasonable monthly expenses. 
If Mr. Crompton's net income is to be imputed at 
$3,208.00 per month and his needs, according to the 
Court, were $1,972.00 per month, then how could the Court 
expect him to meet his needs and pay $285.00 per month 
child support, $1,100.00 per month alimony and the 
$254.00 per month additional bills assigned to him? 
Mr. Crompton had documented his monthly expenses to 
be $3,177.00. He acknowledged that a female friend 
resided with him who could assist with the expenses to 
some degree. These expenses also included his 
emancipated daughter whom he was assisting, a factor 
which should be considered reasonable and necessary. 
Conclusionary or inadequate findings on each of the 
factors to be considered in an alimony award has 
repeatedly been reversed. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 
(Utah App. 1992). Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257 (Utah 
App. 1993). Even if adequate findings are present, they 
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cannot constitute an abuse of discretion. Paffel v. 
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 
P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) and Willev v. Willev, 227 
U.A.R. 39 (Utah App. 1993). The alimony award in this 
case is based on inadequate findings and exceeds the 
Court's discretion. It should be reversed. 
It would have been more equitable and logical if the 
Court found the Cromptons' monthly needs to be equal, 
combined their joint net incomes (without overtime) , then 
provide each with the same standard of living. As it 
was, there was no finding or explanation as to why the 
Court found Mrs. Crompton's monthly needs to be about 
$230.00 per month more than Mr. Crompton's and provide 
her a support award to more than meet that, yet reduced 
Mr. Crompton substantially below the Court's findings as 
to his monthly needs. 
POINT II 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FASHION AN 
ALIMONY AWARD PREMISED UPON A REQUIREMENT THAT 
THE DEFENDANT WORK FIFTEEN HOURS PER WEEK 
OVERTIME. 
The alimony obligation imposed upon Mr. Crompton by 
the trial Court was based upon a historical income 
showing Mr. Crompton had worked frequent overtime. 
Accordingly, the Court ordered an alimony amount premised 
on him having to work fifteen hours each week overtime. 
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With respect to creating the fifty-five hour per 
week requirement in setting alimony, the Court said: 
Court finds that it is likely that he 
will continue to work overtime to 
satisfy the lifestyle that he has 
developed over the years. Court in 
fixing his income for alimony purposes 
has looked at his historical income 
which ranges somewhere in the low 
sixties to the low 70,000 range each 
year. However, the Court finds that 
it's not reasonable to expect him to 
work these kind of hours for a failed 
marriage. In other words, often a 
husband may sacrifice and work what 
the Court would deem unreasonable hours 
to take care of his family and meet the 
lifestyle and obligation that the — 
that the family may have acquired. 
But that in a divorce, it's unreasonable 
to expect him to continue to do that, 
and therefore, the Court will not apply 
historical income for the purposes of 
computing alimony. Instead, the Court 
will impute to him what might be called 
a reasonable or income from a reasonable 
work ethic. I think most of us work 
more than 40 hours a week and where he 
has historically worked more than 40 
hours a week the Court will apply a 
reasonable work ethic to him and the 
Court has judged that to be somewhere 
between 50 to 55 hours, and in this 
case, will use somewhere around 55 
hours as the hours that he would 
reasonably be expected to provide for 
his wife so that she can enjoy somewhat 
the standard of living to which the 
parties have become accustomed. (R46) 
Mr. Crompton acknowledged that historically he had 
considerable overtime. He said that overtime was not 
required as a condition of his keeping a job. It was not 
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guaranteed by his employment. It was not always 
available. It was probably going to be less available in 
the future. Of the fifty or so individuals who had his 
same job title, only eight or ten of them worked as much 
overtime as him. He indicated that the only reason he 
worked those hours was because of the large debts that 
had been created during the course of the marriage. 
Besides the debts listed on his exhibit, those debts 
included the purchase of an expensive home (T77)f 
furniture, taxes and other items (T50-53). Even 
Mrs. Crompton acknowledged that during the last several 
years, they were financially distressed. (T17) The 
parties were living beyond their means. 
By virtue of their having sold the home prior to the 
divorce trial, the home mortgage was terminated and most 
all of their debts were paid by the equity produced from 
the sale of the home. The standard of living, or more 
appropriately the standard of indebtedness, was 
completely different at the time of trial than it had 
been. Living beyond one's means should not be the 
standard of living by which alimony is measured. These 
folks clearly had created a lifestyle that should not be 
perpetuated. The debts, according to their respective 
exhibits, reflected spending that could not adequately be 
-24-
covered, even with Mr. Crompton's overtime. Those debts 
were: 
AVCO - $97.00/month, $1,682.00 balance. A 
consolidation of several bills to get a 
smaller monthly payment. 
NORWEST - $57.00/month, $204.00 balance. 
A consolidation of several bills. 
R.C. WILLEY - $43.00/month, $120.00 balance. 
A revolving account. 
ZIONS BANK - $30.00/month, $942.00 balance. 
A check overdraft protection account. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK - $60.00/month, approx. 
$2,124.00 balance. 
ZCMI - $35.00/month, $340.00 balance. 
NORDSTROM - $50.00/month, $250.00 balance. 
MERVYNS - $65.00/month, $325.00 balance. 
LIL AUDREYS - $20.00/month. 
COLONIAL NATIONAL BANK - $125.00/month, 
$3,900.00 balance. 
AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION - $169.00/month, 
$3,400.00 balance. Plaintiff's 
1984 Toyota. 
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1978 TAHITI BOAT - $157.00/month, 
$3,700.00 balance. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 7) 
The issue of overtime in imposing an alimony 
requirement has never directly been addressed in this 
State. The uniform child support guidelines define 
income from earned income sources as limited to the 
"equivalent of one full-time job". 78-45-7.5, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended). This is the measuring stick 
for the determination of income in setting child support. 
Although this child support provision has not been 
interpreted in Utah, it seems to suggest that a person's 
second job or substantial overtime should not be 
considered in the calculation of their child support 
obligation. If this limitation has been legislatively 
created for child support, it would seem to suggest an 
equal, if not greater, application to alimony. 
As far as can be determined, California is the only 
State to directly address the use of overtime in alimony 
assessment. In Re Marriage of Simpson. 841 P.2d 931; 14 
Cal Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal 1992). The Court held that a 
spouse's: 
earning capacity (for purposes of 
award of spousal or child support) 
generally should not be based upon 
an extraordinary work regimen, but 
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instead upon an objectively 
reasonable work regimen as it would 
exist at the time the determination 
of support is made. (at 936) 
This would be true even if the supporting spouse engaged 
in extraordinary work hours during the marriage. In 
support of its holding, the Simpson Court cited In Re 
Marriage of Smith, 225 Cal. App. 3d 469 (1990) , which 
concluded that: 
The parties' actual marital standard 
of living has reduced significance 
as a point of reference for 
determining [wife's] reasonable 
needs and support, due to the fact 
that during the marriage [husband] 
worked excessive hours and the 
parties living beyond their means. 
A more appropriate measure of 
[wife's] post-separation needs is 
what would have been a reasonable 
standard of living for the parties 
given what [husband] would have 
earned had he worked at a reasonably 
human pace (Id. at 493). 
In defining a "reasonable work regimen" as contrasted to 
an "extraordinary regimen", the Simpson Court said that 
it should: 
be dependent upon all relevant 
circumstances, including the 
choice of jobs available within 
a particular occupation, working 
hours, and working conditions. 
Established employment norms, such 
as the standard 40 hour work week, 
are not controlling but are 
pertinent to this determination. 
In certain occupations a normal 
work week necessarily will require 
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in excess of 40 hours or occasional 
overtime and thus perhaps an amount 
of time and effort which may be 
considered reasonable under the 
circumstances. A regimen requiring 
excessive hours or continuousf 
substantial overtime, however, 
generally should be considered 
extraordinary, (supra, at 937) 
There are certain types of employment where working 
more than forty hours per week would be normal and 
perhaps even necessary. Self-employed individuals 
frequently create a work regimen that is necessary to 
maintain their business. Some employers require more 
than forty hours per week as a condition of the 
employment. Some employers guarantee overtime and that 
is an inducement to accept the job. None of these are 
present here, however. 
It is unreasonable to suggest that Mr. Crompton 
should continue to have to work fifty-five hours per week 
for the foreseeable future in order to maintain his ex-
wife on a standard of living that both acknowledged was 
premised upon excessive indebtedness particularly when 
that indebtedness no longer exists. 
Since Mr. Crompton is not contesting the Court's 
factual finding concerning his historical overtime 
income, but is only challenging the Court's legal 
conclusion that he pay alimony based upon a work 
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requirement of fifty-five hours per week, the appellate 
Court should afford no special deference to the trial 
Court's conclusion and should review the decision for 
correctness. Smith v. Smith. 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 
1990) and Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 
1992). 
POINT III 
BECAUSE OF THE DISPARITY IN VALUES OF 
PERSONAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO EACH, THE 
TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE AN 
ADJUSTMENT IN THE DIVISION OF THE 
HOME EQUITY FUNDS. 
The parties had stipulated to the manner in which 
the personal property would be divided. Each of the 
parties presented their own exhibits reflecting their 
opinions as to the value of the items of personal 
property going to each. 
According to Mr. Crompton, the value of the personal 
property being awarded to him was $2,020.00 while the 
value of the personal property being awarded to 
Mrs. Crompton was $12,955.00. (Defendant's Exhibit 10) 
Mrs. Crompton claimed that the value of the personal 
property going to Mr. Crompton was $2,760.00 while the 
value going to her was $3,895.00. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5) 
While there is a considerable discrepancy between their 
respective views as to the value of those items of 
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personal property, Mrs. Crompton at least acknowledged 
that she was coming out ahead. 
Mr. Crompton suggested that to make some adjustment 
in the imbalance of the value of personal property, it 
would be equitable if he were allowed to retain the 
$1,358.00 balance in the parties' reserve account after 
the sale of their home, that Mrs. Crompton be required to 
pay as her debts the obligations to Mervyns, Lil Audreys 
and America First Credit Union and that the balance of 
the debts, excluding the Tahiti boat, be paid by the 
other proceeds from the sale of the home. (T83-84) 
In entering its order, the Court did require 
Mrs. Crompton to assume the debts to Mervyns, Lil Audreys 
and America First Credit Union, but required Mr. Crompton 
to pay the debt to Avco without further explanation or 
finding (T50). The Avco debt had an approximate 
$1,682.00 balance at the time of trial. The Court denied 
any other efforts to correct the imbalance on the 
division of the personal property. In that regard, the 
Court said: 
Now, with respect to the property, as 
I understand my responsibility, you 
have stipulated the allocation, but 
there was some dispute over values, 
and yet I really didn't receive a lot 
of direction from either of you in 
terms of what you wanted me to do to 
remedy what even by both schedules 
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appears to be somewhat of a disparity. 
Of course Mr. Hamilton's schedule is 
much closer in value than yours, 
Mr. Florence, and I am not sure that 
based on the amount of testimony that 
I heard that I can do anything other 
than just award each party the property 
that has been designated in these 
schedules, and award to him also the 
tools that apparently were omitted on 
one schedule. Although there, even by 
both schedules, there is a slight 
disparity in valuesf it's the judgment 
of the Court that he's in a much 
better position to replace those than 
she is. I suspect that he'll work 
more than the overtime I have identified, 
and when he does, he's making a good 
wage, at time and a half and sometimes 
double time. I suspect if she were to 
go out and get a second job to try to 
replace some of these things, it would 
not be much of an income, so just 
weighing everything, I'm just going to 
award each party those items of 
personalty that have been identified 
in the schedules. (R50-51) 
This failure to correct an obvious imbalance in the 
division of personal property was clearly unjust or an 
abuse of discretion, thereby allowing the appellate Court 
to modify that decision. Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 
1076 (Utah 1988); Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah 
App. 1988); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 
1989). A trial Court's property distribution must be 
based on findings which place a dollar value on the 
distributed assets and liabilities. Munns v. Munns, 790 
P.2d 116, 119 (Utah App. 1990). The Court's view that 
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Mr. Crompton could work more than fifty-five hours per 
week in order to replace the items of personal property 
to establish himself and that he should be required to do 
that rather than Mrs. Crompton is clearly unjust or an 
abuse of discretion. As it was, the Court not only 
failed to allow Mr. Crompton to retain the $1,358.00 
reserve funds, but ordered him to pay the Avco debt, 
which by Mr. Crompton's view was a marital obligation, 
thereby further creating a disparate treatment of the 
two. 
The Court has not made adequate factual findings 
that would justify or explain the failure to correct the 
imbalance as required by Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421 
at 424 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Crompton is requesting that the alimony award to 
his former wife be based upon his ability to produce 
income from a full-time job, not a fifty-five hour per 
week work requirement that does nothing more than 
perpetuate an excessive standard of living. If their 
probable net incomes from a forty hour work week were 
equalized, each would be able to maintain a reasonable 
standard of living under a reasonable work regimen. 
To better equalize the division of personal property 
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and allocation of debts not paid by the home equity 
funds, Mr. Crompton should be entitled to retain the 
$1,358.00 reserve funds and the Avco debt should be 
considered marital and paid by both parties. 
DATED this \fft~ day of March, 1994. 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH ; * • —r 
* * * * * 
VICKIE L. CROMPTON, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
CLIFFORD B. CROMPTON, 
DEFENDANT. 
' 3 3 » 1 fin 7 fi5 
NOV 0 21993 
RULING 
CASE NO. 924902496 
***** 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY FOR 
HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON, JUDGE, SITTING 
AT OGDEN, UTAH ON THE 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER 1993. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
***** 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: DAVID R. HAMILTON 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
***** 
REPORTED BY DEAN OLSEN, CSR 
847 E. 2800 N. 
NORTH OGDEN, UTAH 84 414 
WK. 399-8405 HM. 782-3146 
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1
 OGDEN. UTAH OCTOBER 27, 1993 10:15 A.M. 
2 THE COURT: GOOD MORNING, GENTLEMEN. LET ME PUT YOU 
3 ON THE SPEAKER PHONE PLEASE. CAN YOU BOTH HEAR OKAY? 
4
 MR. FLORENCE: YES. 
5 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR 
6 DECISION IN THE MATTER OF CROMPTON VERSUS CROMPTON. RECORD 
1 SHOULD SHOW THAT I'M IN CHAMBERS WITH MY CLERK AND COURT 
8 REPORTER AND THAT I HAVE ON THE TELEPHONE — ON THE TELEPHONE 
9 CONFERENCE DAVID HAMILTON REPRESENTING THE PLAINTIFF AND BRYAN 
10 FLORENCE REPRESENTING THE DEFENDANT. 
11 COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT AND RULINGS: 
12 THE PLAINTIFF IS A BONA FIDE RESIDENT OF WEBER COUNTY AND WAS 
13 SO FOR THREE MONTHS NEXT PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THIS DIVORCE 
14 ACTION. THE PARTIES WERE MARRIED ON DECEMBER 8, 1990 — 1967 
15 IN* SALT LAKE CITY. TWO CHILDREN WERE BORN AS ISSUE OF THIS 
16 MARRIAGE, BUT ONLY ONE IS A MINOR. HER NAME IS KIMBERLY, AND 
17
 SHE IS' 17. AND SHE WILL GRADUATE FROM HIGH SCHOOL AND REACH 
18
 HER MAJORITY IN JUNE OF 1994. 
19
 THE PARTIES HAVE STIPULATED THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS A FIT 
20 I AND PROPER PERSON TO BE AWARDED THE CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' 
21 MINOR CHILD, SUBJECT TO STANDARD VISITATION BY THE DEFENDANT. 
22
 AND THE COURT WILL ORDER THAT. 
23 COURT FINDS THAT THERE ARE IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES 
24 RENDERING THE MARRIAGE IRREMEDIABLY BROKEN. THE PLAINTIFF IS 
25
 AWARDED A DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
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MR. FLORENCE, DID YOU — HAS YOUR CLIENT FILED A 
COUNTERCLAIM? 
MR. FLORENCE: I DON'T BELIEVE SO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: I DIDN'T RECALL THAT, BUT IT OCCURRED TO 
ME THAT I DIDN'T CHECK THE FILE ON THAT. 
MR. FLORENCE: I DON'T THINK WE'RE ASKING FOR A DIVORCE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. THEN THE PLAINTIFF IS AWARDED A 
DECREE OF DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF IRRECONCILABLE 
DIFFERENCES. 
THE COURT HAS ACCEPTED THE STIPULATION BY THE PARTIES 
RESPECTING MANY OF THE ISSUES EXCEPT THE ONES THAT WERE TRIED, 
AND THE COURT APPROVES THAT STIPULATION, AND INCLUDING THE 
AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT AS AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES. 
MR. HAMILTON, YOU'LL NEED TO FILE A WORKSHEET FOR THE 
FILE, HOWEVER. 
MR. HAMILTON: OKAY. 
THE COURT: COURT FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS EMPLOYED 
AT MERVYN'S IN OGDEN AND EARNS MONTHLY INCOME OF $1343 WITH A 
NET INCOME OF APPROXIMATELY $1003. 
THE DEFENDANT IS EMPLOYED AS AN ELECTRICIAN AT KIMBERLY-
CLARK WHERE HE HAS BEEN EMPLOYED FOR EIGHT YEARS. HIS BASE 
PAY IS APPROXIMATELY $1458 EVERY TWO WEEKS. HE ALSO WORKS 
SUBSTANTIAL OVERTIME EVERY WEEK, AND HAS EVEN IN TIMES PAST 
WORKED ON HIS DAYS OFF TO HELP RETIRE FAMILY DEBT. ALTHOUGH 
OVERTIME IS NOT GUARANTEED OR REQUIRED AS PART OF HIS 
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1 EMPLOYMENT, COURT FINDS THAT HISTORICALLY HE HAS WORKED 20 TO 
2 30 HOURS A WEEK OVERTIME INCLUDING IN SOME INSTANCES DOUBLE 
3 OVERTIME ON SUNDAYS. 
4 COURT FINDS THAT IT'S LIKELY THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO 
5 WORK OVERTIME TO SATISFY THE LIFESTYLE THAT HE HAS DEVELOPED 
6 OVER THE YEARS. COURT IN FIXING HIS INCOME FOR ALIMONY 
7 PURPOSES HAS LOOKED AT HIS HISTORICAL INCOME WHICH RANGES 
8 SOMEWHERE IN THE LOW SIXTIES TO THE LOW 70,000 RANGE EACH 
9 YEAR. HOWEVER, THE COURT FINDS THAT IT'S NOT REASONABLE TO 
10 EXPECT HIM TO WORK THESE KIND OF HOURS FOR A FAILED MARRIAGE. 
11 IN OTHER WORDS, OFTEN A HUSBAND MAY SACRIFICE AND WORK WHAT 
12 THE COURT WOULD DEEM UNREASONABLE HOURS TO TAKE CARE OF HIS 
13 FAMILY AND MEET THE LIFESTYLE AND OBLIGATIONS THAT THE — THAT 
14 THE FAMILY MAY HAVE ACQUIRED. BUT THAT IN A DIVORCE, IT'S 
15 UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT HIM TO CONTINUE TO DO THAT, AND 
16 THEREFORE, THE COURT WILL NOT APPLY HISTORICAL INCOME FOR THE 
17 PURPOSES OF COMPUTING ALIMONY. INSTEAD, THE COURT WILL IMPUTE 
18 TO HIM WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED A REASONABLE OR INCOME FROM A 
19 REASONABLE WORK ETHIC. I THINK MOST OF US WORK MORE THAN 4 0 
20 HOURS A WEEK AND WHERE HE HAS HISTORICALLY WORKED MORE THAN 4 0 
21 HOURS A WEEK THE COURT WILL APPLY A REASONABLE WORK ETHIC TO 
22 HIM AND THE COURT HAS JUDGED THAT TO BE SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 50 
23 TO 55 HOURS, AND IN THIS CASE, WILL USE SOMEWHERE AROUND 55 
24 HOURS AS THE HOURS THAT HE WOULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO 
25 PROVIDE FOR HIS WIFE SO THAT SHE CAN ENJOY SOMEWHAT THE 
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1 COURT THAT A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
2 SHOULD BE $1100 PER MONTH ON A PERMANENT BASIS, SUBJECT TO 
3 MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION BY OPERATION OF LAW. 
4 IN MAKING THIS AWARD, THE COURT IS COGNIZANT OF THE 
5 FOLLOWING THINGS: IS COGNIZANT OF HER CLAIM FOR BETTER 
6 TRANSPORTATION. I'M ALSO COGNIZANT THAT THE CHILD SUPPORT IS 
7 GOING TO TERMINATE IN LESS THAN A YEAR. THERE IS SOME CASE 
8 LAW THAT SUGGESTS THAT WHEN THAT TERMINATES THAT THE — THAT A 
9 WIFE CAN COME IN AND SEEK A PETITION FOR MODIFICATION TO OPEN 
10 THE ALIMONY QUESTION. THE COURT WILL NOT PERMIT THAT IN JUNE 
11 OF 1994. IN OTHER WORDS, IN LOOKING AT ALIMONY, I HAVE 
12 ANTICIPATED THAT. 
13 AND FINALLY, THE COURT IS ALSO COGNIZANT THAT SHE IS 
14 ELIGIBLE, OR IN THE FUTURE, TO HAVE A MODEST INCREASE IN HER 
15 WAGES. AND I'M TRYING TO SEE WHERE THAT WAS. APPARENTLY SHE 
16 COULD BE AN AREA COORDINATOR WITHOUT A DEGREE OR ONE STEP 
17 HIGHER'AND RECEIVE A DOLLAR AN HOUR MORE. 
18 THE COURT IN THAT REGARD WILL FURTHER FIND THAT SHE IS 45 
19 YEARS OF AGE. THAT SHE WAS MARRIED WHEN SHE WAS 19. FIND 
20 FURTHER THAT SHE HAS PRIMARILY WORKED IN RETAIL SALES AND ALSO 
21 HAD A BRIEF STINT AS A DENTIST FOR TWO AND A HALF YEARS. THAT 
22 SHE'S WORKED A TOTAL OF 16 YEARS OUT OF THE MARRIAGE. THERE 
23 WAS A PERIOD OF ABOUT EIGHT YEARS AFTER THE SECOND CHILD WHEN 
24 SHE DIDN'T WORK. FIND THAT SHE IS PROBABLY EMPLOYED AT HER 
25 I  HIGHEST AND BEST EMPLOYMENT. 
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1 IN LOOKING AT THE PROPERTY, THE PARTIES HAVE STIPULATED— 
2 MR. FLORENCE: ARE YOU LEAVING DEBTS, YOUR HONOR? 
3 THE COURT: YES, I AM. IS THERE ANYTHING I 
4
 OVERLOOKED? 
5 MR. FLORENCE: WELL, I DON'T KNOW IF YOU HAVE OR HAVEN'T. 
6 ON THE TOP OF EXHIBIT "B" OR EXHIBIT 11, AVCO, YOU DID NOT 
7 MENTION THAT AND I DIDN'T KNOW IF THAT WAS BY DESIGN OR 
8 OMISSION. 
9 THE COURT: THAT'S HIS. THANK YOU FOR CLARIFYING 
10 THAT. I HAVE AN "H" BY IT AND THAT'S HIS DEBT. 
11 MR. FLORENCE: OKAY. 
12 THE COURT: AND I MEANT TO COVER THAT. THANK YOU. 
13 ARE THERE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DEBT ALLOCATION? 
14 MR. FLORENCE: NO. 
15 MR. HAMILTON: JUST ONE THING THAT I WASN'T CLEAR ON, AND 
16 THAT WAS RELEVANT TO THE BALANCE THAT WE WERE GOING TO USE, 
17 THE 12;225, I CAN'T REMEMBER IF THAT WAS BEFORE OR AFTER HER 
18 AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER RENT WERE INCLUDED. YOU MENTIONED THAT 
19 BRIEFLY. 
20 || THE COURT? NO, THAT IS TO BE PAID AND THEN WHATEVER 
21 IIIS LEFT OVER IS TO BE THEN APPLIED TOWARD THE DEBT. 
22 || NOW, WITH RESPECT TOT HE PROPERTY, AS I UNDERSTAND MY 
23 I  RESPONSIBILITY, YOU HAVE STIPULATED THE ALLOCATION, BUT THERE 
24 WAS SOME DISPUTE OVER VALUES, AND YET I REALLY DIDN'T RECEIVE 
25 IIA LOT OF DIRECTION FROM EITHER OF YOU IN TERMS OF WHAT YOU 
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THAT SHE MAY HAVE SINCE OUR LAST HEARING OR ORDER — OR SINCE 
THE SEPARATION THAT THAT IS A MARITAL DEBT? 
THE COURT: HOW MUCH WAS USED, MR. FLORENCE? 
MR. FLORENCE: THAT'S WHAT I DON'T REMEMBER. I'M NOT 
SURE THAT IT WAS SPECIFIC OTHER THAN SHE, AS I RECALL, SAID 
THAT SHE HAD MADE SOME CHARGES THERE WHILE THIS MATTER WAS 
PENDING. 
THE COURT: LET ME SEE IF I CAN FIND ANYTHING — 
MR. HAMILTON: TOTAL BILL WAS ABOUT 250 BUCKS LOOKS LIKE. 
MR. FLORENCE: THAT'S WHAT IT WAS WHEN I THINK THEY 
SEPARATED OR HE STARTED MAKING PAYMENTS, BUT I'M NOT — THAT 
EXHIBIT ~ 
MR. HAMILTON: THAT'S WHAT MY EXHIBIT SHOWS THAT IT HAD A 
BALANCE OF ABOUT 250. 
. THE COURT: I DON'T SEE ANYTHING IN MY NOTES RELATIVE 
TO"THAT, AND I TOOK SOME NOTES ON EACH OF THOSE THINGS AS — 
ON THE,COURTESY COPY YOU PROVIDED TO ME. FOR SOME REASON, MR. 
FLORENCE, THERE'S JUST NOTHING BY THAT. AND DO YOU RECALL 
ANYTHING, MR. HAMILTON? 
MR. HAMILTON: I DON'T. AND IT MAY BE SOMETHING THAT 
CAME OUT — CAME BEFOREHAND. ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT I KNOW 
THAT THERE'S — THAT ON THE EXHIBIT THAT I PROVIDED IT WAS 
ABOUT 2 50 BUCKS. 
MR. FLORENCE: WELL, IF THAT'S WHAT IT IS, I DON'T HAVE A 
PROBLEM WITH IT. WHAT I WORRY ABOUT, AND I MAY BE WAY OFF, 
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1 PURSUANT TO MY AGREEMENT THAT WE WOULD RESERVE THAT AS AN 
2 ISSUE FOR YOU TO DECIDE. I JUST WANT TO MAKE SURE WHAT YOUR 
3 DECISION WAS, SO ~ 
4 THE COURT: OKAY. 
5 MR. HAMILTON: AND THEN RELATIVE TO THE OCTOBER, I JUST 
6 ASSUME THAT'S COMING OFF OF HER SHARE OF WHAT'S LEFT AFTER THE 
7 PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS. 
8 THE COURT: THAT'S CORRECT. 
9 MR. HAMILTON: RIGHT. 
10 MR. FLORENCE: OKAY. 
11 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
12 MR. FLORENCE: DAVID, DO YOU MIND SPLIT — SHARING THE 
13 COST OF HAVING A COPY OF THE TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY DEAN AND 
14 ILL PAY HALF AND YOU PAY HALF? 
15 MR. HAMILTON: THAT'S AS FAR AS THE ORDER FOR TODAY? 
16 MR. FLORENCE: YES. 
17 MR. HAMILTON: YEAH, THAT'S FINE. 
18 MR. FLORENCE: IS THAT ALL RIGHT WITH THE COURT REPORTER? 
19 THE COURT: HE'S SMILING YES, 
20 MR. FLORENCE: OKAY. 
21 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
22 II MR. FLORENCE: BYE. 
23 II MR. HAMILTON: BYE. 
24 II ***** 
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DAVID R. HAMILTON (1318) of 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
635 25th Street 
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INTHESECOI'.!!•! P'llH'IAI, SMSTRK " " l l " WRRFR COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICKIE T CROMPTON, * 
* 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. * 
* 
CLIFFORD BRLN1 CK( )MI' I ()N, * 
* 
Defendant. * 
This matter came on regui.;. • c uf 
the Judges of the above-entitled Court, on September 28, 1993, and the Plaintiff appeared in 
person and with counsel, David T on, and tin: Dclcndaut appeaic . I 
c.\,mH>i i^ ti.ii. i. ; ' „,'n,, )!H1 the parties having testified in their own behalf and counsel 
having argued the case, and the Court being fully advised, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS nj; P A ' T 
1. The Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide resident of Weber County, State of Utah, 
and has been for more than three (3) months immediately prior to the commencem , e 
action. 
2. Plaintiff ai : ~ fendant are husband and wife, having married on or about 
December h. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
crvi_\ . 
JUDGE: L l 
0 
3. Two (2) children have been born as issue of the marriage, one of whom is a 
minor, to-wit: Kimberly, age 17. Kimberly will graduate from high school in June, 1994. 
4. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody and control 
of the parties' minor child. 
5. Defendant is entitled to reasonable rights of visitation. 
6. There are irreconcilable differences between the parties which will not permit the 
marital relationship to continue. 
7. The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce, the same to become final 
upon signature and entry thereof. 
8. The parties stipulated to the following items: 
A. That the Plaintiff be awarded the care, custody and control of the 
parties' minor child, Kimberly, subject to Defendant's rights of reasonable 
visitation. 
B. That the Defendant pay to Plaintiff the sum of $333.90 per month, 
as and for child support, one-half (1/2) on or before the 5th and the remaining 
one-half (1/2) on or before the 20th day of each month. All payments are to be 
made directly to Plaintiff unless otherwise directed by Plaintiff in writing. The 
support award is calculated utilizing Plaintiffs gross monthly income of 
$1,343.00 and the Defendant's gross monthly income on a 40 hour per week 
basis of $3,158.00 per month. The Defendant is given a $46.00 credit towards 
the health insurance premium that he pays to insure the minor child, resulting in 
a net monthly support payment of $285.00. The payments shall be made until the 
minor child's 18th birthday or graduation from high school with her normal 
graduating class, whichever occurs later. 
C. Each party shall assume and pay any debts that they have 
individually incurred since the separation. 
D. The Defendant is to be awarded the following items of personal 
property, subject to the debts and encumbrances owing thereon, which he is to 
assume and pay and hold Plaintiff harmless thereon: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
i. 
J. 
k. 
1. 
1992 Nissan Pathfinder (lease). 
Tahiti Ski Boat, trailer and paraphernalia. 
Snow blower. 
Video camera. 
Computer. 
Stereo equipment. 
Wheelbarrow. 
14-foot ladder. 
Defendant's mountain bike. 
Defendant's snow ski equipment. 
Defendant's ski diving equipment. 
Camping equipment, with exception of those items of Plaintiff. 
E. The Plaintiff is to be awarded the balance of the marital personal 
property. 
F. That each party have a Woodward interest in the other's 
retirement/pension benefits. 
G. That each party conform with the requirements of the Standard 
Medical Provisions. 
H. The Defendant shall maintain his present life insurance program, 
naming the parties' children as primary beneficiaries thereof, but he may add 
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other biological children as pro rata beneficiaries. 
9. Those stipulated items are reasonable and accepted by the Court and should be 
made a part of the Decree of Divorce. 
10. The Plaintiff is employed by Mervyn's and earns a gross monthly income of 
$1,343.00, with a monthly net of $1,003.00. 
11. The Defendant is employed as an electrician at Kimberly Clark and has been for 
eight (8) years. The Defendant's base income of $1,458.00 every two weeks. The Defendant 
has worked a substantial number of overtime hours on a weekly basis, including days off, to 
help with the family debts. Defendant's overtime is not guaranteed; however, historically, the 
overtime has run at least 20 to 30 hours per pay period, including double-time on Sundays. It 
is likely that the Defendant will continue to work overtime. 
12. Defendant's historical income has been in the $60,000.00 to $70,000.00 range per 
year. 
13. It is not reasonable that the Defendant will continue to work the same number of 
hours to support a failed marriage; occasionally, parties will work an excess number of hours 
to support a family, and in the current circumstances, the Court will not impute anticipated 
annual income. 
14. The Court anticipates that a reasonable work period for the Defendant would be 
55 hours per week. The same would be necessary to assist Plaintiff to enjoy a standard of living 
which is somewhat representative of the standard to which she has become accustom during the 
marriage. The Plaintiffs reasonable living expenses, including payment on her automobile are 
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approximately $2,200.00. This amount is modest and perhaps unrealistically low. 
15. In addition to the Plaintiffs net income of $1,003.00 per month, she will have 
monthly child support of $285.00, for a total of $1,288.00 in available monies. 
16. The Defendant's reasonable expenses are set at approximately $1,972.00. This 
represents expenses for the Defendant alone, not calculating the expenses of others in his home. 
17. The Plaintiff is 45 years of age, having been married to the Defendant at age 19. 
The Plaintiff has worked historically in retail sales, except for approximately two and one-half 
(2-1/2) years work in a dental office. Plaintiff has, in fact, worked during approximately 16 
years of the marriage. The Plaintiffs current employment is the "highest and best" employment 
available to Plaintiff. 
18. The parties are entitled to an approximately equal standard of living. The 
Plaintiffs reasonable monthly gross income will be approximately $4,935.00, with taxes 
reducing the amount by 35%, resulting in a monthly net of $3,208.00. 
19. The Plaintiff is in need and unable to satisfy her needs through her monthly 
income and the Defendant does have an ability to pay alimony. The Plaintiff should be awarded 
and the Defendant Ordered to pay permanent alimony in the sum of $1,100.00 per month. The 
alimony should be paid until Plaintiffs death, cohabitation and/or remarriage. 
20. In making a determination of the alimony award, the Court is aware of the 
following specific circumstances: 
A. The Plaintiff has a claim for better transportation, in view of the 
age and condition of her automobile. 
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B. The Defendant's obligation for child support will terminate in less 
than a year. The Plaintiff specifically will not be entitled to seek a modification 
of the Order at the time the minor child graduates from high school, as the Court 
has considered that fact in arriving at a calculation for the alimony. 
C. The Plaintiff is eligible for only modest increases in her wage, in 
view of her experience and the availability for advancement at her company. 
21. There remains approximately $12,225.00 in proceeds available from the sale of 
the parties' house, after payment of Plaintiffs rent of $500.00 each for August, September, 
October and November, 1993. In addition, there is $1,170.00 in a reserve account, for a total 
of $13,395.00. 
22. The parties have incurred debts and obligations during the marriage. 
23. The $13,395.00 should be utilized to pay the following marital debts of the 
parties: 
A. Norwest, with a current balance of $204.55. 
B. R.C. Willey's, with a current balance of $124.31. 
C. Zions Bank, with a current balance of $951.35. 
D. First Security Bank, with a current balance of $2,124.16. 
E. ZCMI, with a current balance of $341.24. 
F. Nordstrom, with a current balance of $253.12. 
G. Colonial National, with a current balance of $3,791.70. 
24. After satisfaction of the aforementioned debts, any remaining balance should be 
divided equally between the parties, noting that the $500.00 paid to Plaintiffs landlord for 
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October and November shall be credited against Plaintiffs share. 
25. There are remaining debts which should be paid as follows: 
A. Plaintiff should pay Mervyn's, America First Credit Union on her 
1984 Toyota, Li'l Audrey's, Discover Card and Express Clothing, together with 
any separate indebtedness she may have incurred, holding Defendant harmless 
thereon. 
B. Defendant should pay America First Credit Union on the Tahiti 
boat, Avco, and any separate indebtedness he may have incurred, holding 
Plaintiff harmless thereon. 
26. The parties stipulated to the division of personal property and although there is 
a slight disparity with Plaintiff receiving more dollar value, the Defendant is better positioned 
to replace items than is the Plaintiff. The Defendant is specifically given a first right of refusal 
to purchase the following items, should Plaintiff decide to sell them: Brass tableware and 
Noritaki China. Further, the parties should cooperate to copy all family photos, video and Super 
8 films and divide the cost equally. 
27. The Plaintiff has incurred substantial attorney's fees and is in need of assistance 
to satisfy the same. Plaintiffs income is modest and her income is necessary to simply satisfy 
her basic expenses. 
28. There is a relative parody between the parties in their incomes, in view of the 
alimony award and the Defendant is not in a position to pay anything towards Plaintiff's fees 
and, thus, each party should be Ordered to pay their own attorney's fees and costs. 
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BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce against the Defendant. 
2. The Plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody and control of the parties' minor 
child, subject to reasonable visitation, which is set forth in the Standard Order of Visitation 
which is in operative effect in the district. 
3. The Plaintiff should receive and Defendant Ordered to pay, as and for child 
support, the net sum of $285.00 per month, to begin immediately and remain payable until the 
child turns 18 or graduates from high school with her normal graduating class. Said support 
shall be paid one-half on or before the 5th and one-half on or before the 20th day of each month. 
Further, the Defendant shall maintain the medical, dental and health insurance for the benefit 
of the children, with each party paying one-half of any non-covered medical or dental expenses 
incurred on behalf of the children, pursuant to the Standard Medical Provisions currently in 
effect in the dfstrict. 
4. The Plaintiff should receive and the Defendant Ordered to pay alimony in the sum 
of $1,100.00 per month, until Plaintiffs death, cohabitation or remarriage, beginning 
immediately. Said alimony payments shall be made on or before the 20th day of each month. 
5. The Plaintiff is awarded, pursuant to the Woodward decision, one-half of 
Defendant's retirement proceeds. The Plaintiffs counsel shall prepare a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order to accomplish the same. 
6. From the proceeds available from the home in reserve account, the following 
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debts should be paid: Norwest, R.C. Willey's, Zions, First Security Bank, ZCMI, Nordstrom 
and Colonial National Bank, with any remaining proceeds to be divided equally between the 
parties. 
7. The $1,000.00 was paid towards the Plaintiff's October and November rent should 
be calculated against her interest in the remaining proceeds. 
8. The Plaintiff should pay the obligations to Mervyn's, America First Credit Union 
on the 1984 Toyota, Li'l Audrey's, Discover Card and Express Clothing, together with her own 
separate debts and obligations. 
9. The Defendant should pay the obligations to America First Credit Union on the 
Tahiti boat and Avco, together with any separate debts and obligations he has incurred. 
10. The Defendant is to be awarded the following items of personal property, subject 
to the debts and encumbrances owing thereon, which he is to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff 
harmless thereon: 
a. 1992 Nissan Pathfinder (lease). 
b. Tahiti Ski Boat, trailer and paraphernalia 
c. Snow blower. 
d. Video camera. 
e. Computer. 
f. Stereo equipment. 
g. Wheelbarrow, 
h. 14-foot ladder. 
i. Defendant's mountain bike. 
j . Defendant's snow ski equipment. 
k. Defendant's sky diving equipment. 
1. Camping equipment, with exception of those items of Plaintiff. 
11. The Plaintiff is to be awarded the balance of the marital personal property. 
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12. Each party should be responsible to pay their own respective attorney's fees and 
costs. 
lis W d DATED this OOfr/day of November, 1993. 
ROVEDAS TO FORM 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Defendant 
D T L Y O N 7 MICHAEI 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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DAVID R. HAMILTON (1318) of 
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, HAMILTON & SHAW £ i j 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3317 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICKIE L. CROMPTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLIFFORD BRENT CROMPTON, 
Defendant. 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, one of 
the Judges of the above-entitled Court, on September 28, 1993, and the Plaintiff appeared in 
person and with counsel, David R. Hamilton, and the Defendant appeared in person and with 
counsel, Brian R. Florence, and the parties having testified in their own behalf and counsel 
having argued the case, and the Court being fully advised, and having previously made its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters the following: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce against the Defendant. 
2. The Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of the parties' minor child, 
subject to reasonable visitation, which is set forth in the Standard Order of Visitation which is 
in operative effect in the district. 
* 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
* 
* CIVIL NO. 924902496 
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3. The Defendant is Ordered to pay to Plaintiff, as and for child support, the net sum 
of $285.00 per month, to begin immediately and remain payable until the child turns 18 or 
graduates from high school with her normal graduating class. Said support shall be paid one-
half on or before the 5th and one-half on or before the 20th day of each month. Further, the 
Defendant shall maintain the medical, dental and health insurance for the benefit of the children, 
with each party paying one-half of any non-covered medical or dental expenses incurred on 
behalf of the children, pursuant to the Standard Medical Provisions currently in effect in the 
district. 
4. The Defendant is Ordered to pay to Plaintiff, as and for alimony, the sum of 
$1,100.00 per month, until Plaintiffs death, cohabitation or remarriage, beginning immediately. 
Said alimony payments shall be made on or before the 20th day of each month. 
5. The Plaintiff is awarded, pursuant to the Woodward decision, one-half of 
Defendant's retirement proceeds. The Plaintiffs counsel shall prepare a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order to accomplish the same. 
6. From the proceeds available from the home in reserve account, the following 
debts are to be paid: Norwest, R.C. Willey's, Zions, First Security Bank, ZCMI, Nordstrom 
and Colonial National Bank, with any remaining proceeds to be divided equally between the 
parties. 
7. The $1,000.00 that was paid towards the Plaintiffs October and November rent 
should be calculated against her interest in the remaining proceeds. 
8. The Plaintiff is to pay the obligations to Mervyn's, America First Credit Union 
on the 1984 Toyota, Li'l Audrey's, Discover Card and Express Clothing, together with her own 
separate debts and obligations. 
9. The Defendant is to pay the obligations to America First Credit Union on the 
Tahiti boat and Avco, together with any separate debts and obligations he has incurred. 
10. The Defendant is awarded the following items of personal property, subject to the 
debts and encumbrances owing thereon, which he is to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff 
harmless thereon: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
i. 
J-
k. 
1. 
1992 Nissan Pathfinder (lease). 
Tahiti Ski Boat, trailer and paraphernalia 
Snow blower. 
Video camera. 
Computer. 
Stereo equipment. 
Wheelbarrow. 
14-foot ladder. 
Defendant's mountain bike. 
Defendant's snow ski equipment. 
Defendant's sky diving equipment. 
Camping equipment, with exception of those items of Plaintiff. 
11. The Plaintiff is awarded the balance of the marital personal property. 
12. Each party is to pay their own respective attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED this day of November, 1993. 
MICHAEL D. LYON / 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
PROVED AS TO FORM: 
irian R. Florence 
Attorney for Defendant 
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